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This paper sets up a general equilibrium model, in which firms are heterogeneous due to 
productivity differences and workers have fairness preferences and hence provide full effort 
only if their factor return is sufficiently high. With the wage considered to be fair by workers 
depending on the operating profits of the firm in which they are employed, more productive 
firms in this setting are not only larger and make higher profits but they also have to pay 
higher wages due to rent-sharing. This mechanism leads to wage differentiation even if all 
workers share the same individual characteristics. We use this framework to study worker-
specific effects of trade between two symmetric countries. Exporters in this setting make 
higher operating profits and hence have to pay higher wages than non-exporters. This exporter 
wage premium provides a source for losses from trade and, all other things equal, makes a 
negative employment effect of trade more likely. Furthermore, it contributes significantly to a 
general increase in intra-group income inequality among production workers when a country 
moves from autarky to trade. 
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Firm heterogeneity has become an integral part of modern trade theory. With dierences
between rms arising from exogenous productivity dierences, as in Melitz (2003), the key
insight from this literature is that trade exhibits substantially dierent eects on producers
at the lower and the upper ends of the technology distribution even within one and the
same industry. While the most productive producers benet from trade liberalisation since
they start exporting and hence can serve a larger pool of consumers, the least productive
ones are hurt by increasing import competition and have to leave the market. There is
broad consensus in the scientic community that these selection eects are a key aspect of
trade liberalisation and that they need to be taken seriously in order to provide a better
understanding of the channels through which gains from trade can materialise.1
The selection eects of international trade go hand in hand with a reallocation of
workers within the same sector from less productive to more productive rms. While this
eect features prominently in all contributions to the fast-growing literature on trade with
heterogeneous rms, in the vast majority of these studies it does not result in worker-
specic eects, due to the assumption of a perfect labour market which implies that
all rms pay the same wage, and in equilibrium all workers are employed. This is in
conict with considerable evidence from the labour market literature that larger and more
productive rms pay higher wages (see Bayard and Troske, 1999; Faggio, Salvanes and
Van Reenen, 2007), and hence the assumption of a perfectly competitive labour market
seems not be justied empirically (see Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). Therefore, if trade
does not aect all rms symmetrically, one should expect it to have worker-specic eects
that are linked to rm characteristics. This raises several important questions: Is it better
to work for a highly productive rm that expands with liberalisation? What happens to
the employees of rms that have to close down due to import competition? How does
reallocation of workers across rms aect the wage distribution?
To address these questions we use a variant of the model we developed in Egger and
1There is also empirical support for these selection eects. See, for instance, Bernard and Jensen (1995,
1999), Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) and Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007).
2Kreickemeier (2009), EK2009 henceforth, in order to illustrate a plausible mechanism that
links rm-specic and worker-specic eects of trade. Workers are ex ante identical, but
earn dierent wages due to heterogeneity of rms that arises from productivity dierences
as in Melitz (2003). Clearly, such wage dierentiation is only possible if a labour market
imperfection prohibits successful underbidding of wages by outsiders. We consider a fair-
wage eort mechanism along the lines of Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) as source of labour
market imperfection in our model. This mechanism is attractive from the perspective
of analytical tractability and has strong empirical support (see Howitt, 2002; Bewley,
2005).2 The central idea is that workers have fairness preferences and reduce their eort
if the rm does not pay a fair wage. The fair wage is a subjective measure and is an
increasing function of the prots of the rm in which a worker is employed. This captures
a rent-sharing motive of workers that underlies the idea of gift-exchange in the fair-wage
eort model (see Fehr and G achter, 2000; Danthine and Kurmann, 2007) and is well in
line with the empirical observation that rms with higher prots pay higher wages (see
Blanchower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996; Hildreth and Oswald; Arai, 2003).3
Trade between identical countries has the standard eect of raising prots of the most
productive producers. Due to the rent-sharing motive, workers in these rms see their
wages increase relative to the wages paid by non-exporting rms. Since in this model
one and the same rm would pay lower wages under non-exporting than under exporting,
there exists a pure exporter wage premium. This is a direct implication of the fair-wage
eort mechanism, which is well in line with empirical evidence. For instance, Schank,
Schnabel and Wagner (2007) show that an exporter wage premium still exists if one
rigorously controls for rm and worker characteristics. In the otherwise closely related
model developed in EK2009 we choose rm productivity as the rm-internal determinant of
the fair wage. Since productivity at the rm level is an exogenous parameter, the relative
2In a recent book, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) summarize the key advantages of the fair wage-eort
model in the following way. \It is an explanation for unemployment that seems to hit the sweet spot. It
is simple and realistic, and it also ts the facts" (p. 106).
3See Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) for a similar specication of the fair wage constraint in a two-factor
model of international trade.
3wage of two workers continually employed by two dierent rms cannot change in the
process of globalisation, and an exporter wage premium does not exist in this framework.
While the picture that emerges as a consequence of trade liberalisation is therefore not
as rich as in the model variant developed here, worker-specic eects of globalisation still
exist in EK2009, since there is worker reallocation across rms, and between employment
and unemployment.
The focus in this paper is on the worker-specic eect of trade and its consequences
for income distribution, while implications on other aggregate variables will be discussed
only in passing, because they are already well understood from the analysis in EK2009.
There are three other papers that allow for worker-specic eects of trade by modelling
inter-rm wage dierences in a Melitz-style framework. Similar to us, Amiti and Davis
(2008) choose a fair wage-eort model in which the fair wage is an increasing function of
prots at the rm level. Their focus is on wage eects of international trade at the rm
level. Davis and Harrigan (2007) consider a shirking motive of workers to introduce labour
market imperfections into the Melitz framework. While this model also gives rise to wage
dierentiation if rms dier in their monitoring costs, it cannot explain an exporter wage
premium as these costs stay constant when a country moves from autarky to trade. The
exporter wage premium is discussed in a recent paper by Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding
(2009), who consider search frictions as a source of labour market imperfection. However,
in their setting, wage dierentiation arises only if workers dier in their abilities. Hence,
the respective analysis is complementary to ours.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the main as-
sumptions and characterises the autarky equilibrium. In section 3, we introduce trade
between two symmetric countries and derive the equilibrium in the open economy. This
section also presents a comparison between key autarky and trade variables and hence
provides insights into both worker-specic and aggregate eects of trade. The last section
concludes with a brief summary of the main results.
42 Fair wages and heterogeneous rms in the closed economy
We consider an economy that is populated by L workers and produces two types of goods:
dierentiated intermediates and a homogeneous nal output, with the latter being used
as consumption as well as investment good.
2.1 The model: basics
Final output Y is a CES aggregate of all available intermediate goods, q(v), and the













where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between dierent varieties, and the measure
of set V represents the mass of available intermediate goods M.4 We impose the standard
assumption of perfect competition in the nal goods market and choose nal output as our
num eraire good. This implies that the price for good Y as well as the price index P that
corresponds to the CES aggregator in eq. (1) is normalised to one. Prot maximisation






with p(v) representing the price of variety v. The intermediate goods sector is populated
by a continuum of rms, each producing one unique variety, implying that the mass of
available varieties equals the mass of competitors. Furthermore, the intermediate goods
market is characterised by monopolistic competition and hence rms take aggregate vari-
ables as given, while they set wages as a monopolist in the market for their own variety. In
order to produce and distribute their output, rms have to bear a (periodical) xed cost f
in units of nal output. In line with Baldwin (2005) we associate these expenditures with
local beachhead costs and assume that they are identical for all producers. The output of
4Using technology (1) instead of the Ethier (1982) technology with external scale economies we exclude
those trade eects that are purely due to an increase in market size, which are already well understood.
5each rm is linear in labour input l and depends on the rm-specic productivity level
: q = l. It is notable that l measures labour input in eciency units, with the e-
ciency units provided by each employed worker " being determined by a fair-wage eort
mechanism that is described in detail below.
Prot maximisation of intermediate goods producers leads to the standard result of
constant markup pricing, implying that the price set by a rm is proportional to its





with   (   1)=. In Melitz (2003), we simply have c() = 1=, since all rms pay the
same wage, which is normalised to one. In contrast, with labour market imperfections
due to a fair-wage eort mechanism wage payments will generally dier across rms, and
the same may be true { at least in principle { for the amount of labour eciency units
provided by each worker.
2.2 The labour market
The main idea behind the fair-wage eort mechanism is that workers have fairness (or
gift exchange) preferences that relate the eort a worker is willing to provide to the ratio
between the wage oered by the rm in which he is employed and a reference wage which
is subjectively considered to be fair by this worker. The existing literature oers dierent
possibilities for specifying the functional relationship between the eort level and the
wage rate. The most commonly used approach is the one suggested by Akerlof and Yellen
(1988, 1990). They normalise the maximum possible eort provision to one and assume
that workers provide full eort if the wage oered by the rm is at least as high as the
reference wage. If however the rm oers a wage that falls short of the reference wage,
workers reduce their eort proportionally. To put it formally, the functional relationship
between eort provision and wages is given by " = min[w= ^ w;1], where w is the wage per
worker (not per eciency unit) and ^ w is the reference wage. It is an immediate consequence
of the Akerlof and Yellen specication that oering wages which are lower than the fair
6wage does not lower the eective labour costs and hence does not increase prots. Firms
are indierent between all w  ^ w and hence, we can safely assume that they pay at least
the fair reference wage.5 Workers in all rms therefore provide full eort " = 1. If rms
can hire the prot-maximising number of workers if they set w = ^ w, this is what they do
in equilibrium. Throughout our analysis, we concentrate on a parameter domain which
ensures that the fair-wage eort mechanism indeed leads to involuntary unemployment,
so that rms will not have to pay a wage that is higher than ^ w. An explicit condition for
this outcome is derived in subsection 2.4.
As extensively discussed in Akerlof (1982) the wage considered to be fair by a worker
consists of two components: a rm-internal and a rm-external one. The rm external
component is typically associated with a worker's income opportunities outside the present
job, which equals the average income of all employed and unemployed workers (see e.g.
Kreickemeier and Nelson, 2006). Without unemployment compensation, the external com-
ponent is given by (1   U)  w, where 1   U represents the employment rate and  w denotes
the average factor income of those who have a job. The rm-internal component refers to
the rm's protability and hence may be associated with the notion of rent-sharing (see
e.g. Danthine and Kurmann, 2007). In line with Egger and Kreickemeier (2008), EK2008
henceforth, we choose operating prots as a measure of a rm's protability. Due to con-
stant markup pricing, the operating prots of a rm are proportional to its revenues, and
they are given by r()=. Assuming that the fair wage can be represented by a weighted






[(1   U)  w]
1  : (4)
From (4) it is immediate that rms with higher operating prots pay higher wages. Hence,
depending on the rm from which they are hired, workers get a dierent reward although
they are ex ante identical. Clearly, this outcome can be consistent with an equilibrium
only if workers who are employed in rms with low operating prots (or who do not have
a job at all) cannot successfully underbid wages in rms with high operating prots. As
5Akerlof and Yellen (1990, p. 272) argue that rms have a slight preference for paying fair wages and
thus \when their prots are unaected by payment of fair wages, they prefer to do so."
7in other eciency wage models, it is the assumption of an information asymmetry that
prohibits successful underbidding: Firms and workers cannot sign a binding contract on
the eort of workers, and hence any underbidding worker, if hired, would reduce the eort
level if he did not receive at least the rm-specic fair wage. Firms know that, and hence

















Figure 1: Relative wages and relative revenues
In view of eq. (4), we can now express the relative wage paid by two rms 1 and 2 in










There is a second relation between relative wages paid by rms 1 and 2 and their relative
domestic revenues, resulting from the goods market equilibrium condition: Higher wages
lead to higher marginal cost, ceteris paribus, which imply higher prices and lower revenues.












Figure 1 depicts eqs. (5) and (6), where the respective loci are labelled FW and GM for









with   (   1)=[1 + (   1)]. Hence, in the closed economy the relative wage paid by
two rms 1 and 2 can be expressed as an increasing and concave function of their relative









As  < 1, more productive rms have lower marginal cost, but relative to Melitz (2003)
the marginal cost prole across rms is atter, since the higher wage paid by more pro-
ductive rms mitigates their marginal cost advantage, ceteris paribus.
In complete analogy to Melitz (2003) in our model there is a cuto productivity 
below which rms decide not to produce, implicitly dened by the zero prot condition
() = r()=   f = 0. It is clear from (7) that the wage paid by the rm with
productivity , w(), is the lowest wage paid to workers in the economy. Intuitively, the
wage paid by this rm for a given level  depends on the productivity distribution of its
competitors. We follow the by now common approach and assume that rm productivities
follow a Pareto distribution with the lower bound of productivities normalised to one,
yielding cumulative distribution function G() = 1    k.
There is a well-known and immensely useful simplication that follows from assuming
a Pareto distribution in a Melitz-type model: The cuto productivity  is proportional
to the average productivity ~ , which is implicitly determined by (~ ) = =M, implying
that the prot of the average rm equals the average prot per rm in the economy,  .








9In order to ensure that the productivity average has a nite positive value, we assume
k >    1 (which induces k >  for any ) from now on. The wage paid by the marginal
rm can then be derived as follows:6
w() = ; (10)
with   [k=(k )]
1
 1. Since the wage paid by the marginal rm is proportional to the
cuto productivity, the marginal cost of the marginal rm, c(), is a constant and equal
to .
2.3 Firm entry
In analogy to Melitz (2003), we assume that rm entry involves two types of decisions.
First, an unbounded pool of potential entrants decides upon an initial investment of fe
units of nal output. This investment provides access to a lottery in which rms draw
their productivity from the common distribution G(). Each rm has only one draw and
the initial investment is sunk. Subsequently, rms decide upon production, conditional
on the outcome of the productivity lottery. Starting the production process involves an
investment of f units of nal output in each period in which the rm remains active. The
necessity of non-negative per period prots determines the cuto productivity level 
(see above). In view of (5), (7) and (9), we can rewrite the respective zero cuto prot





This implies that prots of the average rm in the market are constant. As discussed in
EK2009, this outcome is an immediate consequence of choosing a Pareto specication for
parameterising the productivity distribution.
Firms in this model have an innite horizon and face a common destruction rate,
which forces a share  of active rms to leave the market in each period. New rms
6Noting that Y = Mr(~ ) holds by denition of ~ , while Y = Mq(~ ) follows from (1), we obtain
p(~ ) = 1. Together with (3), this implies w(~ ) = ~ . Accounting for (7) and (9), nally gives (10).
10enter the productivity lottery until their expected future prots equal the participation
fee. This gives a standard free entry condition (FE). Focussing on steady-state equilibria
and abstracting from time discounting, the free entry condition can be expressed as7
  = (~ ) = ()
k fe: (12)
Together, (11) and (12) determine the cuto productivity level , identical to the one
derived in eq. (17) of EK2009. Thereby, the additional condition that f=fe is suciently
large needs to be imposed in order to ensure that  > 1.
2.4 Aggregate variables
Since free entry of rms drives the expected present value of prots to zero, labour income
per worker (1   U)  w is a suitable (utilitarian) welfare measure. It is easily determined
using the fair wage constraint (4) for the marginal rm, as well as (10) and the zero prot
condition for the marginal rm, r()= = f:







Noting that by means of the constant markup pricing rule in (3) a constant share  of
revenues accrues to workers, aggregate output is proportional to total labour income and
hence given by Y = (1   U)L  w=.
Total employment is determined by the adding-up condition that the sum over em-
ployment in all rms equals (1 U)L. Tedious but straightforward calculations, which are
available upon request, yield
1   U =
k   







It is easily checked in (14) that unemployment is strictly positive, and hence the fair wage-
eort mechanism provides a binding constraint, if f > . This condition also ensures
7Notably, a steady state is characterized by the following two conditions. First, the mass of rms newly
starting production equals the mass of rms exiting the market due to destruction, M. Second, all stock
variables, including average productivity and average prots, are constant.
11that even the least productive rm oers a wage payment that is higher than the expected
labour income: w() > (1   U)  w.
From inspection of (14), two conclusions are immediate. On the one hand, the em-
ployment rate, 1   U, is independent of labour endowment L. This is well in line with
the empirical observation that involuntary unemployment is a problem which is equally
important in large and small economies. On the other hand, the employment rate is pos-
itively related to the cuto productivity level, which suggests that unemployment is less
a problem in more advanced economies. To get an intuition for this result, it is useful
to note that the bracket term on the right-hand side of (14) is proportional to the ratio
of aggregate output and the productivity average: Y=~ . A larger output, Y , raises de-
mand for intermediate goods and thereby stimulates employment, all other things equal.
A higher productivity average ~  implies that less workers are needed to produce a given
level of output. This counteracts the former eect. However, since output Y increases
more than propotionally with an increase in , the rst eect dominates and employment
is stimulated when the cuto productivity level (and hence the productivity average) goes
up.8
A key feature of our model is the existence of intra-group inequality. One simple
aspect of this inequality is captured by the existence of involuntary unemployment, as
those who are unemployed earn a lower income than those in a job. In this paper, we
have set the income of unemployed workers equal to zero in order to keep the analysis
simple. A novel aspect of intra-group inequality which is specic to our setting is that ex
ante identical production workers earn dierent factor returns. This result is particularly
8Notably, the comparative-static eects of a change in the cuto productivity level on the employment
rate need to be interpreted with care, because these eects are derived under the assumption that  and
f stay constant. Still, the respective analysis is useful for two reasons. On the one hand, it provides rst
insights on how trade can aect the employment rate in our setting, which will be useful for our discussion
in section 3. On the other hand, the analysis provides insights into the impact of a general productivity
growth as reected by an increase in the lower bound of the productivity distribution, which, in the interest
of notational simplicity, has been normalised to one above. From the comparative-static analysis we can
conclude that such a technological improvement would lead to a higher employment level in our framework.
12notable because the empirical labour literature oers convincing evidence that this form
of inequality is substantial and has continuously increased over the last three decades (see
Katz and Autor, 1999; Barth and Lucifora, 2006; Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008).
A simple summary statistics of intra-group inequality that has also been used by
EK2009 is given by the ratio of the average wage and the wage paid by the marginal rm,




k   (1   )
k   
 !: (15)
The wage ratio in (15) is larger than one for any  > 0. Intuitively, a higher fairness
parameter  raises the weight attached to the rm-internal component of the reference wage
in the workers' fairness considerations and hence increases intra-group wage inequality,
according to (15). This completes our discussion of the closed economy.
3 The open economy
In this section, we consider trade between two identical countries whose economies are of
the type described above. Trade in nal goods is free of any impediments, while interna-
tional transactions of intermediate goods are subject to two types of trade costs: (i) xed
foreign beachhead costs fx (in units of nal output), which must be invested by exporters
in each period in order to operate a distribution network in the foreign economy; (ii)
variable iceberg trade costs which capture the idea that a fraction of goods melts away
en route to foreign consumers. To be more specic, we assume that  > 1 units of the
intermediate good must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive in the foreign economy.
3.1 Exporter selection and wage prole
As in the two-factor model of EK2008, the home market revenue dierential of two rms
















9For a more sophisticated measure of intra-group inequality, see EK2008.
13where superscript e denotes an exporting rm and superscript n denotes a non-exporter.
Both equations can be solved to give
re
rn = (1 + 1 )  < 1 and
we
wn = (1 + 1 )

 1 > 1: (16)
Since exporters have access to a larger pool of consumers, they realise higher operating
prots and hence have to pay higher wages than they would pay under non-exporting.
This is an immediate consequence of the rent-sharing mechanism that is imposed by our
fair-wage eort model. This exporter wage premium lowers revenues in a rm's domestic
market as compared to an otherwise identical non-exporting rm. Hence, in contrast to
both Melitz (2003) and EK2009 the optimal output decisions of each rm in its (poten-
tially) two markets are interdependent.
When a rm decides between exporting and non-exporting, it compares the extra costs
of entering the foreign market { including both the increase in the marginal production
costs, due to the existence of an exporter wage premium, and the additional xed cost
expenditures fx { with the extra benets of getting access to a larger pool of consumers.
Focussing on the empirically relevant case that only the most productive rms self-select
into export status (for which a formal condition will be derived below), the productivity

x of the marginal exporting rm is implicitly determined by the condition that its total









The decision problem of rms regarding non-exporting and exporting is illustrated in gure
2, where t() refers to total prots. In the case of a non-exporter total prots equal prots
from domestic sales, n
t () = n(), while in the case of an exporter, e
t() additionally
accounts for export prots. The rm with cuto productivity  makes zero prots if it
sells its products exclusively to the domestic market, while it would make negative prots
when serving domestic and foreign consumers. Furthermore, since access to a larger pool
of consumers implies that an existing productivity dierential between two rms translates
into a larger revenue dierential under exporting than under non-exporting, the line that
represents potential total prots of exporters is steeper than the line for potential total
14prots of non-exporters. Hence, there exists a unique exporter cuto 
x, such that rms
with  < 
x stay out of the export market, while rms with  > 
x make the additional
















Figure 2: Exporter selection
With Pareto-distributed productivities, we can explicitly solve for the share of ex-
porters in the total mass of rms, which we denote by . As in Melitz (2003), we have
to assume that xed and variable export costs are suciently large in order to induce
self-selection of the most productive forms into export status. As in EK2009 we focus on
the case where the xed export costs are equal to domestic xed costs, fx = f. The share














and it can easily be checked that  is strictly smaller than 1 for all admissible values of .
Furthermore, the share of exporters falls if  increases.
As noted above, any rm has to pay higher wages under exporting than under non-
exporting in order to elicit full eort of its workers. With only the most productive rms
self-selecting into exports status, this implies that in the open economy wage payments
15across rms are a discontinuous function of productivity. The impact of productivity
dierences on wage payments is depicted in gure 3. The locus WPn represents the
wage prole of non-exporters, with the shape of this curve following from our previous
observation that the relative wage between any two non-exporters is a positively sloped
and concave function of their productivity dierential (see eq. (7)). The locus WPe
represents the wage prole of exporters. This prole must lie above the WPn locus, due
to the existence of a pure exporter wage premium (see eq. (16)). Hence, if only the most
productive rms self-select into export status, wage payments shift from prole WPn to



























Figure 3: Wage prole
Figure 3 also depicts comparative static eects of changes in . An increase in  raises
the ratio of the two cuto productivities 
x= and hence lowers the share of exporters
from  to 1. At the same time it shifts the WPe-locus downwards, according to (16).
A deepening of the globalisation process in the form of a reduction in iceberg trade costs
not only increases the share of exporters in the total population of rms but also raises
16the exporter wage premium.
3.2 Characterisation of the average producer
To solve for the trade equilibrium, we dene the average productivity of all rms selling
to the market, which in the case of the open economy include the exporters of the respec-
tive other country. Dening such an average for the open economy is potentially more
complicated than in EK2009, because in the setting considered here rms pay wages from
dierent proles, depending on whether they are exporters or non-exporters (see gure 3).
Hence, we rst need to x the export status of the average rm, in order to determine the
relevant wage prole for this producer. This is an arbitrary decision, and without loss of
generality we associate the average rm with a non-exporter. Noting that Mt  (1+)M
rms (including domestic producers and foreign exporters) sell their products in each
market, we choose the productivity average, ~ t, such that t = Mtn
t (~ t) holds, with t
representing aggregate prots in either country under openness and n
t (~ t)  rn(~ t)= f
denote prots of the average rm.
The derivation of ~ t is shown in detail in EK2008. Since we have assumed f = fx, the








Compared to (9), ~ t replaces ~  in (19), but otherwise both equations are identical. This
implies that the productivity average in the open economy is higher than in autarky if
and only if the cuto productivity  is higher.
As in the closed economy,  is determined by the zero cuto prot condition and
the free entry condition. Again, the mechanism is standard for a model of the Melitz-
type: Prots per rm, which are given by  t  t=M, are higher in the open economy,
which makes entry in the productivity lottery more attractive, ceteris paribus. In order
to restore equilibrium, this has to be balanced by an increase in the cuto productivity,
which by itself makes entry into the productivity less attractive. With Pareto-distributed
productivities we nd the explicit solution  = (1 + )1=k
a, where subscript a refers to
17the autarky scenario. As a consequence, our model reproduces the key insight from Melitz
(2003) that the least productive rms exit the market when a country opens up for trade.
3.3 Welfare, unemployment and income distribution
With the productivity average at hand, we can now determine the key aggregate variables
in the open economy and compare them with their counterparts under autarky. As in the
closed economy, we can use labour income per worker as a utilitarian welfare measure,
and we get








Since the cuto productivity is higher in the open economy, as shown in the previous
section, international trade leads to aggregate gains.10 Notably, aggregate labour income
{ and therefore aggregate output { increases more than proportionally with the cuto
productivity.
Adding up employment levels over all rms and dividing the respective expression by
the total labour force L gives the employment rate









with   =  (;k;;) being a constant that is strictly smaller than 1 + .11 Comparing
(14) and (21), we can distinguish two channels through which trade aects employment
in our setting. On the one hand, it leads to an increase in the cuto productivity. Since,
as shown above, aggregate output increases more than proportionally with , this eect
increases employment, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, exporting induces higher wage
payments and hence a cost-penalty, which, all other things equal, makes the labour market
imperfection more severe. This eect is reinforced by the existence of trade costs, which
renders rms less competitive in their export markets and hence provides an additional
10As in EK2009, losses from trade are possible if fx is suciently small relative to f, and therefore the
selection eect of trade is weak. But note that by assuming production technology (1), which excludes the
standard \love of variety" eect, we have eliminated one potential source of gains from trade.
11An explicit solution for   is provided in eq. (40) of EK2008.
18source for eciency loss. Both of these eects lower employment, ceteris paribus. This is
captured by variable   and the fact that this variable is smaller than 1+ . In general, it
is not clear which of the two eects dominates. However, one can show that employment
is lower in the open economy than under autarky if the rent-sharing parameter  is small,
while trade stimulates employment if  is suciently large. This result diers from insights
in EK2009, where in the case of f = fx employment is always smaller in the open economy
than under autarky.
The nal variable we need to determine is intra-group wage inequality, which in the





From (15) and (22), we can conclude that trade denitely increases intra-group inequality
among production workers. As pointed out by EK2009 this result provides an explanation
for the empirical observation that intra-group inequality and international trade (in par-
ticular in the form of intermediate goods transactions) have simultaneously increased over
the last three decades. In their paper it is a mere compositional eect that is responsible
for the respective impact of trade on intra-group inequality. More workers are employed in
the productive rms as these rms expand production due to access to the export market.
This dominates the counteracting eect of the least productive rms exiting the market
which, ceteris paribus, reduces intra-group inequality.
Our paper goes one step further and emphasises the role of worker-specic eects of
globalisation in a setting that takes the rent-sharing motive in the gift exchange between
rms and workers serious and allows for an exporter wage premium. This links the discus-
sion on intra-group wage inequality to the recent empirical literature on the performance
of heterogeneous rms in an international context. This literature nds conclusive evi-
dence for more productive rms being exporters and for exporters paying a wage premium
that cannot be fully explained by productivity dierences (or other observable dierences)
between exporters and non-exporters (see Schank, Schnabel and Wagner, 2007).
While our previous discussion makes clear that there are gains from trade in our
setting, which are however not equally distributed among all workers, it does not provide
19insights into a core question of international trade theory: Do all workers experience a
wage increase in absolute terms when a country opens up for trade or are there workers
who need to be compensated for their losses? To answer this question, we can distinguish
two groups of individuals: those who remain employed in the same rm when a country
opens up for trade and those who switch their employment status.12
Regarding the rst group of workers, we know from above that the existence of a pure
exporter wage premium implies that workers in exporting rms benet more than pro-
portional from the openening up of a country. However, what about those who remain
employed by a non-exporter? There are two eects, working in opposite directions. On
the one hand, labour income per worker increases, which improves outside income oppor-
tunities and hence raises the wage considered to be fair by workers, ceteris paribus. On the
other hand, operating prots of non-exporters decline, which induces exit of the least pro-
ductive rms and reduces the wage considered to be fair by workers, due to a rent-sharing
mechanism. In EK2009, only the rst eect is present, since the rm-specic determinant
of the fair wage is exogenous. By contrast, in Amiti and Davis (2008) only the second
eect is present, since the rm-external determinant is exogenous. In our analysis, both
of these eects interact in a non-trivial way. It turns out that with f = fx, as assumed,
the positive rm-external eect is always dominant: In view of the fair wage specication





(1   U)  w




and hence wn() > wa() follows from (20). This implies that trade exhibits a lifting-all-
boats eect, with a positive impact on wages in all rms.
In contrast to Melitz (2003), where a lifting-all-boats eect also exists, this however
does not mean that trade necessarily renders all workers better o. The reason is that
trade triggers relocation of labour and hence leads to a switch in the employment status
of at least some workers. To be more specic, there is relocation of labour from less to
12In the following discussion, we ignore those changes in the employment status of workers that are
merely due to the ongoing replacement of incumbent rms by new entrants in the dynamic setting under
consideration.
20more productive rms, which denitely raises income and hence welfare of these workers.
However, as noted in the last paragraph trade also triggers a change in aggregate employ-
ment. To the extent that employment falls, there denitely exists a subgroup of workers
which is worse o in the open economy, while the opening up for trade may render all
workers better o (and hence give rise to a Pareto improvement) if aggregate employment
increases.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we construct a simple general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms
and fairness preferences of workers as a source of labour market imperfection. With
operating prots serving as a rm-internal component of the fair wage, which has to
be paid by rms in order to elicit full eort of workers, this framework gives rise to a
simple rent-sharing mechanism that generates rm-specic wages and leads to intra-group
inequality among ex ante identical production workers. The link between product and
labour market performance in this model is well in line with the empirical observation that
more productive rms are larger, make higher prots and pay higher wages. Extending the
theoretical framework to one with trade between two identical economies, we show that
trade has important worker-specic eects. Most notably, exporting provides access to a
larger pool of consumers and hence leads to higher operating prots. Due to a rent-sharing
mechanism, this generates a pure exporter wage premium.
With selection of only the best rms into export status, a movement from autarky to
trade is typically associated with welfare gains, while the employment eects are not clear
in general. The existence of a pure exporter wage premium introduces a new source of
losses from trade and, all other things equal, lowers employment in the open economy.
Furthermore, it raises intra-group wage inequality and hence contributes to our under-
standing why both intra-group inequality and international trade have simultaneously
increased over the last three decades.
In contrast to our closely related analysis in EK2009, in which for simplicity we used
(exogenous) productivity as the rm-internal component of the fair wage, in the current
21model the relative wage of two workers employed in dierent rms changes if these two
rms have a dierent export status. We can therefore show how worker-specic eects
are jointly determined by rm-specic wage eects that dier for exporters and non-
exporters, and by the reallocation of workers between rms as well as between employment
and unemployment. One limitation the current paper shares with EK2009 and all other
models that build on the framework of Melitz (2003) is that there is only a single factor
of production, and therefore all inequality is intra-group by construction. In EK2008
we have developed a two-factor model that remedies this shortcoming. The framework
features a combination of intra-group and inter-group inequality and thereby presents a
more comprehensive picture of the distributional eects of international trade.
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